windows-ad – Marketing & SEO skill for AI agents

> ⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY

> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.

> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.

> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

> Mandatory confirmation gate

> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:

> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.

> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.

> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.

> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.

>

> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

Windows / Active Directory Security

When to Use

• Mapping and attacking AD trust paths in an authorized engagement.
• Researching escalation routes (AD CS, Kerberos delegation) in labs.

适用场景

• 域渗透、Kerberoasting、AS-REP、委派
• AD CS（ESC1–ESC8 等）证书攻击
• BloodHound / SharpHound 攻击路径
• NTLM Relay / Coercer 强制认证
• 本地提权到域路径（Potato 等作为跳板）

与 attack-chain 关系

• 多阶段从外网到域控 → PRIMARY 可仍是 attack-chain/，本 skill 为 AD 专科
• 已在域内专注身份 → PRIMARY = 本 skill

工作流

1. 枚举

# 示例 Impacket / 内置（需凭据与授权）
nxc smb <range> -u user -p pass
bloodhound-python -d domain.local -u user -p pass -c All -ns <DC>

2. 常见路径（先图后枪）

□ Kerberoast / AS-REP → 离线破解
□ ACL 滥用（GenericAll/WriteDacl）
□ 委派（非约束/约束/基于资源）
□ AD CS 模板错误 → Certipy
□ 中继：LLMNR/NBT-NS + ntlmrelayx（确认授权）

3. 凭证与横向

□ secretsdump / lsassy / mimikatz（严格授权与清理）
□ PtH / PtT / 黄金票仅在授权红队范围
□ 每步写 Evidence；高危等用户确认

工具链

| 工具 | 用途 |

|------|------|

| BloodHound / SharpHound | 路径图 |

| Certipy | AD CS |

| Impacket / NetExec | 横向与枚举 |

| Rubeus / Mimikatz | 票据与凭证（授权） |

| Coercer / Responder | 强制认证 / 投毒 |

参考

• references/ad-attack-paths.md
• ../pentest-tools/references/network-attack-defense.md
• ../attack-chain/
• seeds: field-journal/seed-005_ad-certipy-esc1.md seed-007_ntlm-relay-coercer.md seed-013_kerberoasting-spn.md

路由上下文

上游: MASTER R24

下游: 报告 docs-generator；需 EDR 研究 edr-bypass-re

MUST NOT: 无授权 DCSync / 黄金票打生产

任务完成自检

• [ ] 是否先有图/枚举再有利用？
• [ ] 是否记录可复现命令并脱敏？
• [ ] 是否遵守 scope 禁止项？
• [ ] Checklist？

Limitations

• Domain attacks can destabilize production AD; stage in labs first.
• Relay feasibility depends on the target protocol’s signing, channel-binding and authentication protections; one signing setting is not a universal relay verdict. Record the actual service and protection state rather than assuming a path works.

> Adapted from [zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill](https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill) (MIT).