saas-security-posture – Security skill for AI agents

SaaS Security Posture Management for Startups

Secure every SaaS tool your company relies on with practical, command-driven hardening.

When to Use This Skill

• SOC 2 preparation — auditors need evidence of MFA, access controls, and OAuth governance.
• Suspicious OAuth app — an employee authorized a third-party app with broad scopes.
• SaaS sprawl — teams sign up for tools with company email and nobody tracks them.
• Post-incident hardening — after phishing or credential leaks, tighten every surface.

Start with authorized read-only inventory. Broad MFA/OAuth/SSO/retention/SCP changes can lock out users, destroy retained evidence or stop services. Record exact targets and existing state, validate recovery, and apply only approved changes in staged scope. Export files may contain sensitive grants/identifiers: use restrictive permissions and minimize/redact output. Before branch-protection PUT, fetch and merge existing settings rather than replacing required checks or actor restrictions with this example.

2. SaaS Inventory Audit

Google Workspace — OAuth Grants

gam all users show tokens > oauth_tokens_audit.csv

GitHub — Installed Apps

gh api /orgs/{ORG}/installations --paginate \
  --jq '.installations[] | {app: .app_slug, permissions: .permissions, created: .created_at}'
gh api /orgs/{ORG}/credential-authorizations --paginate \
  --jq '.[] | {login: .login, credential_type: .credential_type}'

Slack — Approved and Pending Apps

curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}" \
  "https://slack.com/api/admin.apps.approved.list" | jq '.approved_apps[] | {name: .app.name, id: .app.id}'
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}" \
  "https://slack.com/api/admin.apps.requests.list" | jq '.app_requests[]'

AWS — IAM Credential Report

aws iam generate-credential-report
aws iam get-credential-report --output text --query 'Content' | base64 -d > iam_credential_report.csv

Master Inventory Template

tools:
  - name: Google Workspace
    owner: [email protected]
    sso: true
    mfa: enforced
  - name: GitHub Enterprise
    owner: [email protected]
    sso: true
    mfa: enforced
  - name: Slack Business+
    owner: [email protected]
    sso: true
    app_approval: required
  - name: AWS Organizations
    owner: [email protected]
    sso: true
    scp_enforced: true

---

3. GitHub Security Hardening

# Enforce 2FA and find non-compliant members
gh api -X PATCH /orgs/{ORG} -F two_factor_requirement_enabled=true
gh api "/orgs/{ORG}/members?filter=2fa_disabled" --paginate --jq '.[].login'

# Verify SAML SSO identities
gh api /orgs/{ORG}/credential-authorizations --paginate \
  --jq '.[] | {login: .login, saml_name_id: .saml_name_id}'

# Review the org IP allow list in supported enterprise settings or GraphQL.
# The REST /orgs/{ORG}/ip-allow-list endpoint is not supplied here.

# Branch protection on main
gh api -X PUT /repos/{ORG}/{REPO}/branches/main/protection \
  -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" --input - <<'EOF'
{
  "required_status_checks": {"strict": true, "contexts": ["ci/build","ci/test"]},
  "enforce_admins": true,
  "required_pull_request_reviews": {
    "required_approving_review_count": 2,
    "dismiss_stale_reviews": true,
    "require_code_owner_reviews": true
  },
  "restrictions": null,
  "allow_force_pushes": false,
  "allow_deletions": false
}
EOF

# Audit PATs and revoke stale tokens
gh api /orgs/{ORG}/personal-access-tokens --paginate \
  --jq '.[] | {owner: .owner.login, name: .token_name, expires: .token_expires_at}'
gh api -X DELETE /orgs/{ORG}/personal-access-tokens/{PAT_ID}

# Audit deploy keys and webhooks
for repo in $(gh repo list {ORG} --limit 500 --json name -q '.[].name'); do
  gh api /repos/{ORG}/${repo}/keys --jq '.[] | {title: .title, read_only: .read_only}'
done
gh api /orgs/{ORG}/hooks --jq '.[] | {url: .config.url, events: .events, active: .active}'

---

4. Slack Security

Use the supported admin console to review app approval, session duration, retention and export permissions for the actual plan; do not invent admin Web API methods for these settings. Record current values, stage the proposed changes and verify them after authorized application. Retention changes can delete evidence and require the organization's approved policy.

For Enterprise workspace discoverability, the supported admin.teams.settings.setDiscoverability method accepts team_id and one of open, invite_only, closed or unlisted; it requires an org-installed admin token with the documented scope. Always check the JSON ok field, not just HTTP200. Discoverability is not a substitute for access policy.

5. Google Workspace Hardening

Use the Admin console and the installed GAM version's documented commands; the generic gam update org ... settings examples are not a validated GAM interface. Review and stage:

1. 2-Step Verification enrollment/enforcement for the intended organizational unit, with recovery access verified first.

2. Third-party OAuth app access and explicitly trusted client IDs.

3. External Drive sharing, transfer and group membership policies.

4. Device management/lock/encryption requirements on managed devices. A wipe is destructive; verify exact device, ownership and approved recovery before issuing it.

5. SPF, DKIM and DMARC records for the actual sending domain; do not enforce reject before authorized senders and reports are validated.

6. AWS Account Security

# Root account lockdown — verify MFA, remove access keys
aws iam get-account-summary --query 'SummaryMap.AccountMFAEnabled'
aws iam get-account-summary --query 'SummaryMap.AccountAccessKeysPresent'

# SSO permission set with least privilege
aws sso-admin create-permission-set --instance-arn "${SSO_INSTANCE_ARN}" \
  --name "DeveloperAccess" --session-duration "PT8H"
aws sso-admin attach-managed-policy-to-permission-set \
  --instance-arn "${SSO_INSTANCE_ARN}" --permission-set-arn "${PERMISSION_SET_ARN}" \
  --managed-policy-arn "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/ReadOnlyAccess"

Service Control Policies

{
  "Version": "2012-10-17",
  "Statement": [
    {"Sid": "DenyRootActions", "Effect": "Deny", "Action": "*", "Resource": "*",
     "Condition": {"StringLike": {"aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::*:root"}}},
    {"Sid": "DenyLeaveOrg", "Effect": "Deny",
     "Action": "organizations:LeaveOrganization", "Resource": "*"}
  ]
}

aws organizations create-policy --name "DenyRootActions" \
  --type SERVICE_CONTROL_POLICY --content file://deny-root-actions.json
aws organizations attach-policy --policy-id "${POLICY_ID}" --target-id "${ORG_ROOT_ID}"

# Organization-wide CloudTrail
aws cloudtrail create-trail --name org-security-trail \
  --s3-bucket-name company-cloudtrail-logs \
  --is-multi-region-trail --is-organization-trail --enable-log-file-validation
aws cloudtrail start-logging --name org-security-trail

---

7. OAuth App Review

Identify High-Risk Grants

# Google — find apps with dangerous scopes
gam all users show tokens | grep -E "(drive|gmail|admin)" > high_risk_oauth.txt

# GitHub — find apps with write access
gh api /orgs/{ORG}/installations --paginate \
  --jq '.installations[] | select(.permissions.contents == "write") | {app: .app_slug}'

Revoke Dangerous Grants

gam user [email protected] delete token clientid APP_CLIENT_ID  # single app
gam user [email protected] delete tokens                        # all apps
gh api -X DELETE /orgs/{ORG}/installations/{INSTALLATION_ID}           # GitHub app
curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer ${SLACK_ADMIN_TOKEN}" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  "https://slack.com/api/admin.apps.uninstall" -d '{"app_id": "A0XXXXXXX"}'

Scope Risk Classification

CRITICAL — revoke unless justified:
  Google: mail.google.com, admin.directory.user | GitHub: admin:org, repo | Slack: admin
HIGH — review carefully:
  Google: googleapis.com/auth/drive | GitHub: contents:write | Slack: channels:read
LOW — generally safe:
  Google: userinfo.email | GitHub: read:org | Slack: identity.basic

---

8. Admin Account Protection

Create dedicated least-privilege admin identities through the supported identity provider. Never pass passwords as CLI arguments (including generated command substitutions); use the supported secret-manager or secure interactive provisioning path. Verify recovery before enforcing hardware-backed MFA. Maintain an authorized break-glass process with restricted credential storage, tested recovery, audited use and post-use rotation.

MFA policies must account for IAM-user sessions, service roles and federated/SSO identities. A blanket deny based on a missing aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent key can block automation or federation; test scoped policies and recovery in a nonproduction account before attachment.

9. Data Loss Prevention

# Google Dr

… (full content is in the download package)