model-supply-chain-security – Security skill for AI agents
Secure the AI model supply chain with artifact signing, provenance attestation, SBOM workflows, dependency controls, and trusted model promotion.
Install the model-supply-chain-security skill with one command
Pick the tool you use, copy the command and paste it in your terminal. The skill lands in that tool's skills folder and is ready in your next session.
Claude Code
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills && curl -fsSL https://skill.dn1nguoi.com/z/model-supply-chain-security-d076f.tgz | tar xz -C ~/.claude/skills
Call it in Claude Code: /model-supply-chain-security – then describe the task you want done.
Codex
mkdir -p ~/.codex/skills && curl -fsSL https://skill.dn1nguoi.com/z/model-supply-chain-security-d076f.tgz | tar xz -C ~/.codex/skills
Call it in Codex: $model-supply-chain-security – then describe the task you want done.
Hermes Agent
mkdir -p ~/.hermes/skills && curl -fsSL https://skill.dn1nguoi.com/z/model-supply-chain-security-d076f.tgz | tar xz -C ~/.hermes/skills
Call it in Hermes Agent: /model-supply-chain-security – then describe the task you want done.
DeepSeek
mkdir -p ~/.deepcode/skills && curl -fsSL https://skill.dn1nguoi.com/z/model-supply-chain-security-d076f.tgz | tar xz -C ~/.deepcode/skills
Call it in DeepSeek: /model-supply-chain-security – then describe the task you want done.
SKILL.md content
Model Supply Chain Security
Protect models and inference components from tampering, dependency compromise, and untrusted artifact promotion.
When to Use This Skill
Use this skill when:
- Pulling pretrained models from public registries (Hugging Face, TensorFlow Hub)
- Building model-serving containers for production deployment
- Establishing trust policies for ML artifact promotion across environments
- Responding to supply chain incidents affecting ML dependencies
- Meeting SLSA or SOC2 compliance requirements for AI systems
Prerequisites
cosignv2+ installed for signing and verificationsyftfor SBOM generation of model-serving imagescraneorskopeofor OCI image inspection- Container registry with signature support (GHCR, ECR, ACR, Artifact Registry)
- CI/CD pipeline with provenance generation capability
Threats
- Poisoned pretrained weights or adapters
- Malicious model conversion tools or loaders
- Compromised build pipelines and registries
- Insecure runtime images with critical CVEs
- Typosquatting on model registries
- Deserialization attacks via pickle or custom loaders
Control Objectives
- Verify artifact integrity end-to-end
- Prove provenance for every promoted model
- Detect vulnerable dependencies before deploy
- Restrict execution to trusted signed artifacts
Model Signing with Cosign
Sign a Model Artifact
# Generate a keypair (store private key securely)
cosign generate-key-pair
# Sign an OCI-packaged model image
cosign sign --key cosign.key ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:v2.1.0
# Keyless signing with Sigstore (uses OIDC identity)
cosign sign ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:v2.1.0
# Verify the signature
cosign verify --key cosign.pub ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:v2.1.0
# Keyless verification (requires certificate identity)
cosign verify \
[email protected] \
--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com \
ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:v2.1.0Sign Model Weight Files Directly
# For model files stored as blobs (not OCI images)
# Compute digest and sign
sha256sum model-weights.safetensors > model-weights.sha256
cosign sign-blob --key cosign.key model-weights.safetensors \
--output-signature model-weights.sig \
--output-certificate model-weights.crt
# Verify blob signature
cosign verify-blob --key cosign.pub \
--signature model-weights.sig \
model-weights.safetensorsSLSA for ML Pipelines
SLSA Level Requirements for Model Builds
# slsa-requirements.yaml
slsa_levels:
level_1:
- Build process is scripted (not manual)
- Provenance document generated automatically
level_2:
- Build runs on hosted CI service
- Provenance is authenticated (signed)
- Source is version controlled
level_3:
- Build environment is ephemeral and isolated
- Provenance is non-falsifiable (hardened builder)
- Source integrity verified (two-person review)Generate SLSA Provenance for Model Training
# .github/workflows/model-build-slsa.yml
name: Model Build with SLSA Provenance
on:
push:
tags: ['model-v*']
jobs:
train-and-package:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
id-token: write
contents: read
packages: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Train model
run: python train.py --config configs/production.yaml
- name: Package model as OCI artifact
run: |
oras push ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:${{ github.ref_name }} \
model-weights.safetensors:application/vnd.acme.model.safetensors \
model-config.json:application/json
- name: Generate SBOM for training environment
run: |
syft dir:. -o cyclonedx-json > training-sbom.json
- name: Sign and attest
run: |
cosign sign ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:${{ github.ref_name }}
cosign attest --predicate training-sbom.json \
--type cyclonedx \
ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:${{ github.ref_name }}
# Provenance must be generated by a supported reusable workflow invoked at jobs.<job>.uses,
# not as a step. Add a separate dependent job with the actual immutable digest output
# from an identified push step and the selected generator's required inputs.Model Cards for Provenance
# model-card.yaml
model_details:
name: "sentiment-classifier-v2.1.0"
version: "2.1.0"
type: "text-classification"
framework: "pytorch"
license: "Apache-2.0"
provenance:
training_data:
source: "s3://acme-datasets/sentiment-v3/"
hash: "sha256:abc123..."
data_card_ref: "https://internal.acme.com/data-cards/sentiment-v3"
training_config:
source: "git://github.com/acme/ml-models@abc123"
hyperparameters:
learning_rate: 0.00005
epochs: 10
batch_size: 32
build_environment:
builder: "github-actions"
runner: "ubuntu-22.04"
python: "3.11.7"
torch: "2.1.2"
cuda: "12.1"
build_id: "gh-actions-12345"
commit_sha: "abc123def456"
build_timestamp: "2025-01-15T10:30:00Z"
signed_by: "[email protected]"
performance:
accuracy: 0.94
f1_score: 0.93
evaluation_dataset: "s3://acme-datasets/sentiment-eval-v3/"
evaluation_hash: "sha256:def456..."
security:
vulnerability_scan: "clean"
sbom_ref: "ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:v2.1.0.sbom"
last_security_review: "2025-01-10"
known_limitations:
- "May produce biased outputs for underrepresented languages"
- "Not evaluated for adversarial robustness"Registry Scanning
# Scan model-serving image for CVEs
trivy image ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment-serving:v2.1.0
# Generate SBOM for the serving container
syft ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment-serving:v2.1.0 -o spdx-json > serving-sbom.json
# Scan SBOM for vulnerabilities
grype sbom:serving-sbom.json --fail-on critical
# Check for known-malicious model files (pickle scanning)
pip install fickling
fickling --check model.pklAutomated Registry Scan Pipeline
# .github/workflows/registry-scan.yml
name: Nightly Registry Scan
on:
schedule:
- cron: '0 2 * * *'
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
strategy:
matrix:
image:
- ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment-serving:latest
- ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/embedding-serving:latest
- ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/rag-api:latest
steps:
- name: Scan image
run: |
trivy image --severity CRITICAL,HIGH \
--exit-code 1 \
--format json \
--output scan-$(echo ${{ matrix.image }} | tr '/:' '-').json \
${{ matrix.image }}
- name: Verify signatures are still valid
run: |
cosign verify \
[email protected] \
--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com \
${{ matrix.image }}Promotion Policy Enforcement
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""model_promotion_gate.py - Verify model meets all promotion criteria."""
import subprocess
import json
import sys
def check_signature(image: str) -> bool:
result = subprocess.run(
["cosign", "verify", "[email protected]",
"--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com", image],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
return result.returncode == 0
def check_vulnerabilities(image: str) -> bool:
result = subprocess.run(
["trivy", "image", "--severity", "CRITICAL", "--exit-code", "1",
"--quiet", image],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
return result.returncode == 0
def check_sbom_exists(image: str) -> bool:
result = subprocess.run(
["cosign", "verify-attestation", "--type", "cyclonedx",
"[email protected]",
"--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com", image],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
return result.returncode == 0
def check_model_card(image: str) -> bool:
result = subprocess.run(
["cosign", "verify-attestation", "--type", "custom",
"[email protected]",
"--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com", image],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
return result.returncode == 0
def main():
image = sys.argv[1]
checks = {
"signature_valid": check_signature(image),
"no_critical_cves": check_vulnerabilities(image),
"sbom_attached": check_sbom_exists(image),
"model_card_present": check_model_card(image),
}
all_passed = all(checks.values())
for name, passed in checks.items():
status = "PASS" if passed else "FAIL"
print(f" [{status}] {name}")
if not all_passed:
print("Promotion BLOCKED: not all che… (full content is in the download package)
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