hunt-cors – skill Lập trình cho agent AI

HUNT-CORS — Cross-Origin Resource Sharing Misconfiguration

What actually pays (and what does not)

CORS pays High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a

credentialed cross-origin read of sensitive authenticated data, and you

have a browser PoC proving the response body is readable from evil.com.

Two hard browser rules that kill most "findings" — check these FIRST:

• **Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * CANNOT be combined with credentials.**

If the server returns ACAO: *, the browser refuses to send/expose the

response for a credentials: include request. A wildcard-only endpoint is

not credential-exploitable. It is only interesting if the data it serves

is sensitive *without* a session (rare) — usually this is Informational/Low.

• Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true is meaningless on its own. It

matters only if ACAO reflects/allows your specific attacker origin AND a

cross-origin credentialed fetch actually returns a readable body. ACAC on a

response that does not reflect your origin proves nothing.

If you cannot demonstrate a readable cross-origin authed body in a real

browser, you do not have a High. Do not submit header-diffing alone.

---

Crown Jewel Targets

• Reflect-any-origin + credentials — server echoes the Origin header AND

sets ACAC: true → any site reads authed API responses. The classic High.

• Null-origin trust — ACAO: null + ACAC: true. A sandbox iframe (or a

data:/redirect chain) emits Origin: null, so any page can read authed data.

• Subdomain-regex bypass — trusted-origin regex with a parsing flaw. The

correct payload depends on *which* flaw (see Phase 3 — this is where most

skills get it wrong).

• Subdomain takeover → trusted origin — a dangling subdomain that the CORS

policy trusts; take it over, host the PoC there (see hunt-subdomain).

• postMessage missing/loose origin check — handler that processes

event.data without strictly validating event.origin.

---

Attack Surface Signals

Any endpoint returning an Access-Control-Allow-Origin header
API endpoints:   /api/*, /v1/*, /graphql
Profile/account: /api/me, /api/profile, /api/user, /api/session
Secrets/tokens:  /api/tokens, /api/keys, /api/csrf, /api/account/settings
Financial:       /api/balance, /api/transactions
Admin/internal:  /api/admin/*, /api/internal/*

Prioritize endpoints that (a) require a session cookie and (b) return PII,

tokens, CSRF tokens, or other secrets in the body.

---

Step-by-Step Hunting Methodology

Phase 1 — Discover CORS endpoints

# Probe API endpoints across the entire surface. Critical: test MULTIPLE endpoints,
# not just /users — user-specific and resource-specific URLs may behave differently.
while read url; do
  result=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "$url" \
    -H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
    -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control")
  [ -n "$result" ] && echo "=== $url ===" && echo "$result"
done < recon/$TARGET/api-endpoints.txt

# httpx bulk check
cat recon/$TARGET/live-hosts.txt | awk '{print $1}' | \
  httpx -H "Origin: https://evil.com" -match-string "access-control-allow-origin"

Phase 2 — Reflect-any-origin + null origin

Test with MULTIPLE attacker origins (evil.com, null, evil.com:443) against MULTIPLE endpoints — they can behave differently:

# Does the server reflect an arbitrary Origin back?
# Test multiple origins against multiple endpoints in a matrix
for origin in "https://evil.com" "null" "https://evil.com:443"; do
  for endpoint in "/wp-json/wp/v2/users" "/wp-json/wp/v2/users/1" \
                  "/wp-json/wp/v2/posts" "/wp-json/wc/v3/" \
                  "/wp-json/elementor/v1/globals" "/api/me"; do
    echo "--- Origin: $origin on $endpoint ---"
    result=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "https://$TARGET$endpoint" \
      -H "Origin: $origin" \
      -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control")
    echo "${result:-NO CORS HEADERS}"
  done
done

# Vulnerable (the High case):
#   Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com   <- reflects attacker origin
#   Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true          <- + credentials => readable
#
# NOT exploitable for credentialed theft:
#   Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *                   <- browser blocks creds read
#   (no ACAC, or ACAC absent)                        <- not credentialed

# Null-origin trust
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null https://$TARGET/api/me \
  -H "Origin: null" \
  -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control"
# Looking for:  Access-Control-Allow-Origin: null  +  ACAC: true

Phase 3 — Subdomain / trusted-origin regex bypass

The right payload depends on which regex flaw the server has. Identify the

class first, then send the matching payload. Getting this wrong wastes the test

and produces false negatives.

| Server regex (intended: trust *.target.com) | Flaw | Bypass origin that matches | Why |

|---|---|---|---|

| ^https?://.*\.target\.com$ | None — escaped dot + end-anchor. Correct. | (no simple bypass) | evil.target.com is in-scope by design; x.target.com.evil.com ENDS in .evil.com, fails $. Move on or look for subdomain-takeover. |

| ^https?://.*target\.com$ | Missing dot separator (no \. before target) | https://eviltarget.com | .*target\.com$ matches eviltarget.com — attacker registers eviltarget.com. |

| ^https?://.*\.target\.com | Missing end-anchor $ | https://x.target.com.evil.com | regex matches a prefix; .target.com appears, then .evil.com is ignored (no $). |

| ^https?://target\.com | Prefix-only, no $ | https://target.com.evil.com | matches the target.com prefix; the rest is unconstrained. |

| ^https?://.*\.target\.com$ but dot in regex is unescaped (.*.target.com$) | Unescaped dot = "any char" | https://xtargetXcom... style, or https://evilZtargetZcom where Z is any single char | . matches any character, widening the match. |

| Any of the above | Special chars browsers send in Origin | https://target.com%60.evil.com, https://target.com\x60evil.com | some parsers treat backtick/underscore as letters; Safari/older browsers may emit unusual origins. Confirm the browser actually sends it. |

# Send each class-specific payload and watch what the server reflects.
for ORIGIN in \
  "https://evil.target.com" \
  "https://eviltarget.com" \
  "https://x.target.com.evil.com" \
  "https://target.com.evil.com" \
  "https://target.com%60.evil.com" \
  "http://target.com"; do
  RESULT=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "https://$TARGET/api/me" \
    -H "Origin: $ORIGIN" \
    -H "Cookie: $SESSION_COOKIE" | grep -i "access-control")
  echo "[$ORIGIN] -> ${RESULT:-no CORS}"
done

A bypass is real only if the server reflects your registerable origin into

ACAO with ACAC: true. evil.target.com reflecting back is NOT a bug unless

you can actually control a *.target.com host (then see Phase 6 / hunt-subdomain).

Phase 4 — Pre-flight (OPTIONS) gating bypass

Non-simple requests (custom headers, PUT/DELETE/PATCH, non-simple

Content-Type) trigger a CORS pre-flight OPTIONS. The browser only sends

the real request if the pre-flight response authorizes the method/header. Two

things to test:

1. Does the pre-flight authorize arbitrary methods/headers for your origin?

If Access-Control-Allow-Methods / Access-Control-Allow-Headers reflect

whatever you ask for, a malicious origin can drive state-changing requests

(chain to CSRF-style writes that JSON/SameSite would otherwise block).

curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null -X OPTIONS "https://$TARGET/api/account/email" \
  -H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
  -H "Access-Control-Request-Method: PUT" \
  -H "Access-Control-Request-Headers: x-custom-auth, content-type" \
  | grep -i "access-control"
# Vulnerable: ACAO reflects evil.com + ACAC:true +
#   Access-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT  +  Access-Control-Allow-Headers: x-custom-auth
# => attacker origin can issue authed PUT/DELETE with custom headers.

2. Is the pre-flight even enforced server-side? Some servers reflect the

origin on OPTIONS but the actual GET/POST also reflects — the read path is

the bug; the pre-flight just confirms write-path reach. Test the GET/POST

directly too — never assume the pre-flight result equals the real-request

result. Confirm in a browser, because curl ignores CORS entirely.

Phase 5 — Browser PoCs (the only thing that proves impact)

curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 does NOT enforce CORS — it will happily show you a reflected header even

when a browser would block the read. Every CORS High needs a browser PoC.

5a. Reflect-any-origin read (host on evil.com, open while logged into target):

… (nội dung đầy đủ có trong gói tải về)