cloud-k8s – skill DevOps & Hạ tầng cho agent AI

> ⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY

> This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only.

> You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool.

> Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

> Mandatory confirmation gate

> Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:

> 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.

> 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.

> 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.

> 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.

>

> Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

Cloud / Container / Kubernetes Security

When to Use

• Assessing cloud workload or Kubernetes cluster security within an approved scope.
• Reviewing IAM/RBAC configurations for privilege-escalation paths.

适用场景

• 云元数据 SSRF（169.254.169.254 / IMDS）
• IAM 过度权限、公开存储桶、错误安全组
• Docker/containerd 逃逸路径评估
• Kubernetes RBAC、Secrets、Admission、供应链镜像
• 容器镜像漏洞（可联动 supply-chain-security/）

工作流

Phase 1 — 身份与边界

□ 当前身份：云 AK/SK、K8s SA、节点 SSH？
□ 范围：单账号 / 单 cluster / 单 namespace
□ 网络档：authorized_target_only

Phase 2 — 云控制面

# 示例（按厂商替换；MUST 在授权账号内）
aws sts get-caller-identity
aws s3 ls
# Azure / GCP 对应 identity 命令

□ 公开桶 / 错误 ACL
□ 元数据：IMDSv1 vs v2；SSRF 链
□ 角色可扮演（PassRole）与横向

Phase 3 — 容器

□ 是否 privileged / hostPath / hostNetwork
□ capabilities（SYS_ADMIN 等）
□ 可写宿主机路径 → 逃逸候选
□ 镜像历史与已知 CVE → Trivy

Phase 4 — Kubernetes

kubectl auth can-i --list
kubectl --context AUTHORIZED_CONTEXT get pods,svc -n AUTHORIZED_NAMESPACE
# Inspect Secret metadata only if explicitly in scope; do not dump secret values.
kubectl get clusterrolebindings

□ SA token 挂载与权限
□ 危险 admission webhook 缺失
□ etcd / dashboard 暴露
□ 网络策略是否默认放行

工具链

| 工具 | 用途 | 自举 |

|------|------|------|

| kubectl | 集群交互 | 手动 |

| trivy | 镜像/IaC | bootstrap trivy 若可用 |

| kube-bench / kubeaudit | CIS/配置 | 手动 |

| pacu / scoutsuite | 云审计（授权） | 手动 |

| nuclei | 已知云漏洞模板 | bootstrap nmap/nuclei 生态 |

参考

• references/k8s-cloud-checklist.md
• CTF 对照：../../CTF-Sandbox-Orchestrator/competition-agent-cloud/
• ../supply-chain-security/ ../pentest-tools/

路由上下文

上游: MASTER R23

下游: 拿到节点 shell → attack-chain / windows-ad；镜像漏洞 → supply-chain

MUST NOT: 未授权扫公有云其他租户

任务完成自检

• [ ] 是否限定在授权账号/cluster？
• [ ] 发现是否含复现与影响？
• [ ] 是否避免破坏性操作？
• [ ] 报告 / journal？

Limitations

• Cloud provider API calls may incur cost and trigger alerts; coordinate with the owner.
• Escape-path validation must stay inside disposable lab clusters.

> Adapted from [zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill](https://github.com/zhaoxuya520/reverse-skill) (MIT).